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JPRS 58299..

1 December 1976

U S S R

TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1254

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A**  
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Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

<b>BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET</b>	1. Report No. JPRS 68299	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS, No. 1254		5. Report Date 1 December 1976	
7. Author(s)		6.	
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201		8. Performing Organization Rept. No.	
		10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.	
		11. Contract/Grant No.	
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address  As above		13. Type of Report & Period Covered	
		14.	
15. Supplementary Notes			
16. Abstracts  The report contains information on the Soviet military and civil defense establishments, leadership, doctrine, policy, planning, political affairs, organization, and equipment.			
17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17a. Descriptors  USSR Military Organizations Military Facilities Military Personnel			
17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms			
17c. COSATI Field/Group 15C			
18. Availability Statement  Unlimited availability. Sold by NTIS, Springfield, Va. 22151		19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED	21. No. of Pages
		20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED	

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COMMANDER'S AUTHORITY: KEY FACTOR, MUST BE EARNED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Aug 76 p 2

[Article by Col Gen V. Goncharov, first deputy chief of the Main Directorate of Personnel of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "Experience and Problems in Personnel Work -- Position and Authority"]

[Text] Position and authority. These two concepts are closely related. The higher the position a person holds, the greater the service duties and rights will be, the greater the responsibility. But the effectiveness of the person's labor is directly dependent on authority. Our society and party are vitally interested to see that all our leaders have a high level of authority and enjoy the unconditional trust of the masses of people. It is not accidental that the 25th CPSU Congress devoted such fixed attention to personnel policy and management style. "The modern manager," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said at the congress, "should organically combine party loyalty and profound competence, discipline with initiative and a creative approach to work."

It is natural that party loyalty stands first in the series of qualities which describe the present-day leader. How is it manifested, and why does this phrase carry such weight in the evaluation of any officer? Having put these questions, I recall many people who possessed a high degree of party loyalty, that is, they approached every problem from a state point of view, putting the interests of the work above personal interests, and dedicating themselves completely to the performance of their party and service duty.

Here is an example. There was a serious drop in combat and political training in one of the units. In large part the problems resulted from weaknesses in the commander's style of work and his attitude toward the work. Clearly, the interests of the service required that this officer be transferred to another position, one with less independence.

But who were we to entrust with this responsible post, one which was made more significant by the fact that the unit was stationed by itself, in a remote garrison? We decided on officer Ye. Zhidkov, who had graduated from an academy and gained authority by skillfully commanding a subunit

and by exemplary work at headquarters. As he had advanced along the service ladder he had not lost any of his energy, diligence, or modesty. In this he was, perhaps, unchanged. But what unquestionably had been added was responsibility and an exacting attitude toward oneself.

Another year passed. Progress was made and, for the first time in several years, the unit received an evaluation of "good" at the final inspection. Complacency began to appear in certain comrades. Traces of it were found, in particular, in some of the statements at the report-election party meeting. In this situation too the commander's authority and maturity made themselves known. His talk warned against self-admiration and the attempts of certain officers to relax and look at everything through rose-colored glasses.

The further career of officer Ye. Zhidkov is noteworthy and largely typical. He was promoted to the position of chief of staff of a larger unit, then to another high-ranking position. He received the rank of general. And always, as in the past, the paramount things for him were the work, exacting standards in assessing his own labor, and a desire to keep up with the times.

It is in precisely such qualities, exacting standards for oneself, adherence to principle, strict observance of party and state discipline, and a critical attitude, that true party loyalty is manifested first of all. It is the foundation of the great authority enjoyed by such leaders as Maj Gen V. P'yankov, commander of a motorized rifle division and Capt 1st Rank V. Kolondyrets, commander of the cruiser Sverdlov, both of whom were delegates to the 25th CPSU Congress, and many other army and navy officers.

Commander of a division, regiment, ship, battalion, squadron... how much these words mean! We see behind them people endowed with the trust of the party and the people, in whose hands our enormous military-technical potential is placed, who are trusted without restriction, for whom the masses of fighting men are ready to go into battle. We see, therefore, that the position has authority.

But it is a mistake to think that the position, by itself, automatically gives a leader authority. Unfortunately, this mistaken view can still be found. The question of demoting Lt Col V. Kar'kov, a unit commander, was recently raised. What had caused this? What had happened was that Comrade Kar'kov, a generally well-trained officer, took his promotion to a higher position in the service as nothing but recognition of his past achievements, forgetting that every promotion is like an advance payment which obligates the officer to devote even more attention to his own ideological-political and professional growth.

During his time as unit commander Kar'kov had not taken any notable steps forward; he had even lost some of his acquired skills by burying himself in trivial everyday concerns. At the last exercise, in particular, he

directed the subunits uncertainly and made mistakes in the use of equipment and weapons. His lack of high principles and exacting standards did not help him in the eyes of his subordinates when they were left out of the celebrations for the best performers.

It was pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress that people who show lack of responsibility and live "on their record," believing that the position itself will get them authority and respect, cannot be left in positions of leadership. Authority and respect must be won and constantly reinforced by deeds, especially in the field of combat training and personnel education. The commander is a master of battle organization. His authority is based to a significant degree on thorough professional knowledge and unquestioned competence in military questions. Lack of professional skill causes irreparable harm to the officer's authority.

Of course, personnel characteristics such as competence and a practical approach are receiving new content today. A growing place in the practical concerns of commanders at all levels today is taken by problems related to improving the quality and effectiveness of the training and educational process, organizing socialist competition, and using and maintaining equipment and weapons well. For this reason it is becoming especially important to master the art of leadership and make these matters paramount in the officer training system and in individual work with new personnel.

Competence is not simply the sum of one's knowledge. It is a fusion of knowledge and skills multiplied by a creative approach to the work and a heightened "feel" for new things.

It would be ideal if a commander, for example, knew the details of the design of the equipment better than his deputy for technical affairs and the special service officers. But the most important thing is that he be able to rely on the experience and knowledge of his subordinates and correctly, taking account of the development of military affairs, orient them toward solving current and prospective problems. But this demands a broad style of thought which only come with hard work on self-improvement. It is true, as they say, that the well of present-day knowledge is getting deeper and deeper. It is not easy to draw from it, but it must be done. And the higher the position one holds, the deeper and broader are the strata of knowledge which must be mastered.

The authority which is constantly reinforced in work is unquestionably valuable. But certainly there are cases where a person knows the work and is a good organizer, but cannot be said to have authority, that is, to have earned the unconditional trust and deep respect of subordinates. In one of the subunits the commander, giving in to pressure from an administrative worker, began to assign men to work in the local brick plant. The bricks produced in this way were basically used for public needs. But some of them were used to build private garages for cars, including one for the subunit commander. And even though they were paid for, one cannot help seeing all this as an abuse of the service position.

Another factor whose influence on the commander's authority is hard to overrate is what can be tentatively called "non-work-related" activity. Things such as humility in everyday life and in relations with subordinates, accessibility, the ability to attract people, always taking a party-minded, attentive attitude toward others are very important. Nothing is so damaging to authority as arrogance, lack of warmth, and acting important. And no excuse of being too busy or having too many other concerns can justify the absence of real communication with the men.

The commander is not just an organizer, he is also a moral guide and political teacher. He influences those around him by word and deed, by all his behavior. It is commonly known, for example, that where the company commander is a good drillmaster the company will usually be outstanding in drill performance. The same thing applies to other traits of the commander, from the breadth of his political and professional horizons to his personal appearance and how his office is kept; everything affects the attitude of his subordinates toward him, the authority he enjoys.

A higher post assumes, of course, that the officer will be more demanding of himself in all these respects. This is nothing new, but it is useful to recall it. Every now and then one encounters a person who has begun to forget, as he advances up the service ladder, that together with substantial rights come important duties. In such cases some of the blame must be shared by the senior officer who is too "liberal" and the political worker, who is expected to introduce a spirit of party loyalty in educating personnel but has failed to spot the development of certain traits which are alien to the Soviet officer and communist. The personnel agencies cannot stand aside either; they must thoroughly study the men and give comprehensive evaluations of their work and moral-political characteristics.

The importance of work in this area is underlined by the fact that it is directly related to bolstering the principle of one-man command on a party basis. Concern for raising the authority of the commander means concern for further bolstering of one-man command, an important principle of military building and management in the Armed Forces. That is why intolerance of the slightest weaknesses in this area is a matter of great importance.

Significant work has been done in recent years to improve the selection, placement, and education of personnel. The policy of promoting promising young officers to the primary command, political, and engineering-technical positions is being followed actively. "Party concern for their development and education is one of the most important missions of military councils, commanders, staffs, and political agencies," Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense, emphasized in his talk at the science-practical conference of army and navy manager-political workers.



The training year is coming to an end in the army and navy. This was the year of the 25th CPSU Congress. It was marked by particularly hard work to raise the quality and effectiveness of combat and political training and competition and will undoubtedly become a milepost in the development of our personnel. Successful fulfillment of plans, programs, and socialist obligations will be a convincing testimony to their maturity. At the same time this will be the best possible contribution to further raising their authority.

11,176  
CSO: 1801

## LIVING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SOLDIERS: A BIG RESPONSIBILITY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Aug 76 p 2

[Article by Col G. Pastukhovskiy, deputy commander of the Northern Group of Forces in charge of rear services, chief of the rear group: "When Exercises Are Under Way — the Everyday Needs of Fighting Men Under Field Conditions"]

[Text] It has been more than 15 years since I was a young lieutenant, but I still have a clear memory of Lt Col V. Povolotskiy, who commanded our unit. He was a war veteran, a strong-willed, resolute officer who remained calm and collected in any circumstances, which was a major reason for the authority he enjoyed among us, the young officers. Only once in my four years under his leadership did I see the commander "lose control of himself." Here is what happened.

A big tactical exercise was being held late in the fall and our vehicle unit was assigned to traffic control. The weather was cold and it was muddy. The commander repeatedly reminded the officers to see that the traffic controllers were kept warm and fed at the right times. Toward evening he set off to visit the posts, taking me along. We drove over the rough roads of the training field. In the places where the map showed traffic control posts we were met by soldiers. And right there, generally, were tents with lighted stoves and thermoses of hot food and tea.

But one of the companies had not set up warming points in its traffic control area. And we learned that the soldiers there were only getting dry rations. The commander immediately drove the 10 kilometers to company headquarters to see the company commander. I was glad not to be in the shoes of that officer who had not taken care of his men.

It is not accidental that I have recalled that old story which taught us, the young officers, a lesson in taking care of the everyday needs of the men. For such concern by the commander is one of the traditions of our army, a result of the very nature of our Soviet Armed Forces.

A guards motorized rifle regiment was preparing to go out on tactical exercises. Everyone knows how many things the regimental commander has to worry about at such a time. But the officer did not forget to make sure that provision was made for the soldiers' everyday needs in the field. For example, he found time to conduct a demonstration training period, together with his deputy for rear services, for personnel of the food service concerning how to organize food service in the field. And he managed to see that the food points had proper equipment and to find out how it was going to be transported.

The motorized rifle troops had difficult missions during the tactical exercise. But despite the highly dynamic combat actions, they received hot food three times a day and had opportunities to wash up, put their clothing in order, and get needed medical care. It is worth noting that other officers learned from the regimental commander's style of work. I remember the fatherly happiness of Guards Maj I. Mel'neychuk, commander of a motorized rifle battalion, when he was able to give his fighting men soup with fresh greens at one stage of the exercise!

We often discuss the fact that the army today is receiving intelligent young people, highly educated and so on. That is true, but we must not forget that many of the young men entering the army are leaving their solicitous parents and the comforts of home for the first time. And who if not the commanders, political workers, and rear service officers should see that the barracks and the field tents become their second home?

For example, take the same guards motorized rifle regiment. The men are quartered in comfortable, skillfully outfitted barracks; each sub-unit has been given good conditions for everyday life and leisure: clean sleeping rooms, large, well-lighted Lenin rooms, classrooms. Each barrack has an area for drying clothes and footwear and a domestic service room equipped with everything necessary. The soldiers' mess operated by Guards Ensign F. Rubashkin pleases the eye with its cleanliness and well-arranged tables. The menu there is always varied and tasty. The fighting men can spend their free time in the soldiers' tea room which, in terms of layout and service, might be the envy of the finest city cafes.

We should also mention the general attractiveness and good organization of the military post itself. A domestic services combine was recently built. There is a great deal of greenery on post, which is always clean. In short, the whole organization of everyday conditions creates a beneficial situation in which the fighting men can achieve excellent results in combat and political training.

But still, it is simpler to organize everyday life for the fighting men at the post than in the field. The field, however, is where they spend most of their time and where combat skill is forged. And everything, including provision for everyday needs, should promote combat improvement by personnel. But some commanders and administrators still do not understand this.

At a tactical exercise once I encountered the following situation. The men of the tank battalion commanded by Maj V. Kolodin received hot food just twice a day, morning and evening. The midday meal was "combined" with the evening meal. One could say, of course, that during the day the men received dry rations which contained adequate calories. What is more, that is exactly what dry rations are for. But should one use dry rations when there is a possibility of three hot meals a day? The tankists could have had them.

It seems to me that such cases show the inadequate experience of some new battalion commanders, and also regimental commanders, with respect to managing everyday services in the field. While they are energetic, intelligent, and well-trained in military matters, they sometimes feel that questions of the everyday needs of their subordinates are a secondary problem.

A great deal is being done among the troops of our group to eliminate such shortcomings. Questions of managing everyday needs and rear services are studied at assemblies and in the officer training system. For example, a demonstration rear exercise was conducted for unit commanders and their deputies. At it the problems of organizing everyday services for the fighting men under field conditions were studied, in addition to other missions. But such training periods sometimes uncover very serious gaps in the theoretical training of young officers. For this reason I would like to express my wish that our military schools would give future officers better training in organizing everyday services for fighting men in the field.

The Soviet commander is given an honorable and responsible mission: to train and educate the fighting men. He must make them stalwart and skillful defenders of our land, devoted to the party and the people. At the same time the officer must be constantly aware of his responsibility for his subordinates, for preserving and strengthening their health, for their everyday living arrangements. This is one of the important conditions for military success by the fighting men.

11,176  
CSO: 1801

## TASKS SET FOR MILITARY SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES IN NEW TRAINING YEAR

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Sep 76 p 1

[Editorial: "Toward New Successes in Training"]

[Text] The first bell is ringing at our country's training institutions today. The new training year is beginning in an atmosphere where the Soviet people are working enthusiastically to transform the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress into reality. A broad program has been outlined in the materials of the congress for further improving the educational system, keeping it in line with the requirements of scientific-technical progress and the tasks of steadily raising the cultural-technical and educational level of workers, and improving the training of a qualified labor force. Naturally, this program is the guiding light for military-training institutions.

In the past training year military academies, institutes, and schools accomplished a great deal toward improving the whole educational-indoctrination process, raising the scientific and ideological level of training work, and introducing new all-service regulations into the operation and everyday routine of military-training institutions. Graduates of military academies and schools have received effective ideological training, as well as the necessary theoretical knowledge and practical skills for training and teaching subordinates. Today the task of military-training institutions involves improving on our achievements and, on the basis of this, increasing the effectiveness of the educational-indoctrination process, intensifying the ideological-political and military education of students and trainees, improving the quality of their Marxist-Leninist, tactical, and military-technical training, increasing the demands placed on students, and broadly strengthening military discipline, overall organization, and everyday procedure.

Every Soviet officer, no matter what position he holds, must be not only a good military specialist but also an active party supporter and an able spokesman of its ideas among the men. Our military academies, institutes, and schools have been called upon to prepare these types of officers. During the new training year primary attention in the ideological training of students and trainees must be given to the thorough study of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the tenets and conclusions contained in the review report

presented to the congress by the Secretary General of the Central Committee CPSU Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. Here the leading role belongs to the chairs of social sciences. They must strive to raise the ideological-theoretical level of lectures and training seminars, and develop the study of social sciences in close harmony with the materials of the 25th CPSU Congress and with actual problems involving the party's foreign and domestic policies, closely tying theoretical concepts to practical tasks of improving the combat readiness of the armed forces.

Improving the ground, sea and air skill-level of students and trainees represents the primary way of further raising their level of training. Special attention ought to be given to implanting in them the skills of ably controlling subunits, units and ships under the difficult conditions of modern combat, and to teaching them to perform skillfully, decisively, and promptly, and to show resourcefulness. In teaching tactical and special disciplines the new training year must make major strides forward in the development of the creative thinking of students and trainees, as well as in the formulation in them of the ability not only to correctly and promptly make decisions, but also to ably apply them in striving to defeat a strong, well-equipped enemy. The thorough study of the experience of World War II and the new, advanced developments which were the result of the operations of our soldiers and sailors will be invaluable here.

As a result of the tireless efforts of the Communist Party on the behalf of the Soviet armed forces, our army and navy have been outfitted with the most up-to-date weapons and equipment which are constantly being modernized. In this respect the emphasis on the technical training of officers is becoming more important. It is the duty of military-training institutions to equip their students with fundamental knowledge, instill in them a love for their equipment, and lay a firm foundation so that in the field they will be prepared to independently master the newest in combat equipment and weapons. To resolve this task it is necessary to continue to raise the scientific-instructional level of training sessions on technical disciplines, and to give more attention to instilling in students and trainees the skills for working on equipment and its skillful use in modern battle.

In the course of the training process special attention ought to be given to the instructional technique training of students and trainees. Military-training institutions must provide them with the methods of instruction and indoctrination of subordinates. Here it is first of all necessary to see that every training session and each party-political assignment carried out with students and trainees will be a model both in content and in teaching approach. They ought to be more frequently entrusted with conducting their own training sessions, lectures and talks, and drawn into active participation in the work of party and Komsomol organizations. It is also very important to improve the quality of on-the-job training at line units and to more widely involve students and trainees in scientific research work.

It is obvious that the quality of training of military specialists depends to a marked degree on the teaching skills of instructors, their ideological

conviction, creative energy, and outlook, as well as the availability of up-to-date training materials. These problems should represent the primary emphasis in all the instructional-training and scientific-research work of chairs and faculties. An important place in this work belongs to the resolution put forward by the 25th CPSU Congress: to make a greater effort to introduce technical equipment and new training methods into the training process.

At present both military academies and schools have at their disposal notable scientific personnel. The efforts of military scientists should be directed at investigating ways at improving the effectiveness of the educational-training process and at solving various problems of military theory and practical application.

Political organs and party and Komsomol organizations play an important role in the successful solution of the tasks facing military-training institutions. It is their obligation to thoroughly delve into the content of training, teaching and educational work, look after the dissemination of advanced teaching methods, and guarantee the high quality training and education of military specialists. They must carry on a daily and unceasing struggle for good organization and discipline, and strive to see that military-training institutions in respect to military regulations will be a good example on which their students will compare their practical work in the field.

Students and trainees are beginning a new quest for knowledge. Knowledge which gives them the opportunity to ably maintain the combat readiness of units, ships and subunits, and to teach and instruct subordinates at a level required by the times. Their duty is to study hard and approach the mastering of their profession with persistence and creativeness.

6754

CSO: 1801

## DESERT TRAINING REFLECTS NEED FOR BETTER CONDITIONING OF TROOPS

Moscow KASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Sep 76 p 2

[Article by Colonel Medical Service L. Klimov, chief of the Military-Medical Section of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "For the Physically Trained Desert Harshness Poses No Threat"]

[Text] The subunit moved in a straight line across the scorching sand dunes to the indicated area. Time was of the essence. It was necessary to overtake the "enemy" at any price and occupy advantageous positions for combat operations. The commander of the combat reconnaissance patrol was reporting continuously about everything he observed. Suddenly there was silence. Several minutes later the deputy platoon commander reported that the "lieutenant had become ill." Later physicians diagnosed the problem: he had been overcome by sunstroke.

And here is another example. In the subunit commanded by officer V. Asaul, three cases of heat exhaustion were noted over two days. The reason? The men were active during those hours when the sunlight is most intense. Moreover, a water intake schedule was not observed. Many of the soldiers were completely without canteens. The unit's medical service chief, Captain Medical Service T. Ishmuratov, did not set up a proper medical monitoring system. And the poor physical conditioning of personnel to meet the local conditions had a telling effect.

We know that high daily and average monthly air temperatures, small amounts of rainfall, and strong winds carrying large quantities of sand and dust are characteristic of desert conditions during the summer. Tank armor, bodies of specialized vehicles, and other equipment which are left in the open sun can reach temperatures up to 70 degrees and higher. Thus, severe micro-climatic conditions which promote the overheating of an organism are possible in tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry vehicles which have protective outer surfaces. A man's mind is affected, his movements become uncoordinated, and his useful energy is dissipated. He is not nearly as decisive, bold and persistent in his actions.

So how do you fight the harmful effects of a hot sun? The best way to counteract the dangerous whims of the desert is first of all the development of



stamina in people. As we know, this is not an inherited trait and therefore it is necessary to constantly work at it. Thus it is very important to correctly organize the physical training of servicemen, during which it is necessary to implement mandatory medical monitoring.

Positive results in this work have been obtained at the unit where Lieutenant Medical Service V. Polyukh is in charge of the medical service. Together with the physical training coordinator, he selects, among other things, special exercises for officers who are broken down by age groups, and with the help of several tests monitors how an organism bears up under physical loads. Also a record of the health status of each serviceman is carefully kept.

Officer Polyukh devotes considerable attention to the problem of acclimatization. There are many instances, where, after completing military school, young officers upon receiving assignments to hot weather localities fear that conditions there are intolerable. Therefore, it is the duty of the chief of the medical service of a unit to conduct the psychological indoctrination of personnel and explain to soldiers, that a rapid adaption is achieved not through inactivity, but as a result of work and training.

The main thing here is gradualness, the sequence of training, and an increase of physical loads as the time spent in the sun increases. Also the observance of water intake schedules is of special significance: drink as much as is required, but do it prior to work, prior to going into the field, and prior to relaxation.

Experience shows that with the constant training of personnel and observance of water schedules it is possible to achieve the proper adaption and acclimatization, and not undergo the undesirable effects of such things as sunstroke. Incidentally, acclimatization proceeds rather rapidly, with two weeks being enough for the trained, physically hardened individual to adapt to the local conditions.

At units where commanders, military physicians, and physical training specialists are really concerned with getting personnel into shape, and take measures for the acclimatization of those who come from other areas, the Turkestan weather is not detrimental to the health of servicemen.

The military-medical section in the district is doing many things, in order to disseminate the experience of the best military physicians. For example, the work of officers Ya. Mogilevskiy, G. Mikhienko, and others. A military-scientific conference of the district's physicians was devoted to the problem of the medical support of troops who are serving in the desert under the treacherous rays of the sun. Recommendations for the best daily routine for servicemen during the hot season, setting up combat and physical training and water intake schedules, and providing personnel with a sound diet were worked out.

The consistent and continuous toughening, physical training, and observance of established schedules will allow our servicemen to properly perform their combat-training assignments under the difficult desert conditions.

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CSO: 1801

JOURNAL 'BLOKNOT AGITATORA' TO BE RENAMED AS OF 1 JANUARY 1977

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Sep 76 p 2

[Article: "AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA (Agitator of the Army and Navy)"]

[Text] The periodical BLOKNOT AGITATORA of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy has been changed into the periodical AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and will be published under this title beginning 1 January 1977.

The magazine will contain information about fulfillment of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the 10th Five-Year Plan, as well as the achievements of the Soviet people in economic and cultural development.

Regular topics in AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA will include the development of the strength and combat readiness of the Soviet armed forces, their honored traditions, combat training, service life and socialist competition among servicemen, and Komsomol and sports activities.

The magazine will broadly examine the questions of mass-agitation work among servicemen, continually familiarize readers with the practical work and teaching methods of army and navy agitators, propagandists, communists and Komsomol activists, and provide teaching advice.

Materials for presenting discussions and lectures on notable dates, historical-revolutionary and military calendars, and works for aiding students in political courses will be published on a timely basis.

Readers of the magazine will find articles about the achievements of friendly socialist countries, service life and military training in other socialist armies, the development of the international communist and workers' movement, various national liberation conflicts, the aggressive nature of imperialism, its misanthropic ideology and morals, and the armies of imperialist states.

AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA is being published to assist agitators and propagandists, as well as the party and Komsomol aktiv.

Magazine subscriptions are being accepted from all citizens by subscription organizers in military units, on ships, at establishments and military-training institutions of the Soviet Army and Navy, and at communications offices and Soyuzpechat' agencies, as well as by public magazine distributors at enterprises, institutions, organizations, sovkhoses and kolkhoses.

The periodical will be published twice a month. The price of one issue will be 5 kopecks, while a year's subscription will run 1 ruble 20 kopecks.

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CSO: 1801

## DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL COMMANDERS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Sep 76 p 3

[Article by Captain 1st Rank G. Kostev, chief of the naval faculty of the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin, candidate of naval sciences, and assistant professor: "Being in Step with the Times"]

[Text] The modern commander must be able to correctly evaluate and utilize the experience of predecessors, clearly understand today's tasks, and have a feeling for the new, a feeling for the future.

I had the opportunity to experience the beginning of the scientific-technical revolution in military affairs as a commander. I was captain of a diesel boat, and later was in charge of the crew of a basically new vessel -- the nuclear submarine. This was a difficult test for us, the young nuclear submariners. But everyone, who in his mind and heart understood and accepted the demands of the time, as well as worked wholeheartedly, rapidly achieved real professionalism and not only succeeded in his duty, but also made a major contribution to the mastering of a new class of ships.

The naval biography of the communist, Hero of the Soviet Union Vice Admiral A. Mikhaylovskiy, can serve as an example of this innovativeness for the current generation of commanders. While commanding a nuclear submarine and brilliantly mastering the modern equipment, he began work on his master's thesis. And later, while still on the boat, he defended his doctoral thesis. His service work closely paralleled the scientific-research work. He was in step with the times, having shown daring, persistence and party zeal.

That was a difficult beginning period. However, today very complex tasks face a commander, although we are already accustomed to the fact, that equipment is changed and improved at a very rapid pace. But, unfortunately, our seemingly rapid rebuilding does not always work out well. Sometimes there is no thorough and broad comprehension of new concepts to back it up. Undoubtedly, not every officer, even though thoroughly agreeing with the purpose of a new, more up to date ship, is actually equipped to effectively command it. This is because the officer lacks an understanding of the various, but very important changes in the commander's work. And even though these changes are not as prevalent as 10-20 years ago, they are continually arising. And in order

to learn to recognize, distinguish and understand them, it is always necessary to remember what fundamental changes the scientific-technical revolution in military affairs brought to the work of the ship captain.

The introduction of modern weapons, new power engineering concepts, and complex automatic equipment has significantly altered the design of ships and their technical equipment. This has had a marked effect on the nature of the work of the whole crew and primarily of the ship captain.

Not long ago the main command post (GKP) of a ship was situated in the navigation bridge or conning tower. Help for the ship captain was provided in the form of digital information and certain operational data from peripheral instruments forwarded to the GKP and viewed from special equipment. And almost always the captain personally observed the enemy, its composition and operations, and proceeding from this he made his decisions. Moreover, much work was performed using tables or simply on intuition. Combat work required a lot of time, and calculations were frequently only approximations and had to be refined during the course of a battle.

The operational activities of the captain of a modern ship, where the major role is played by the automatic flow of information, previously only of secondary importance, are quite different. For example, on modern submarines the primary control systems are lumped into a single complex: those for controlling the ship, weapons, power, observation and communications equipment, and mechanisms and systems which maintain normal living conditions in compartments.

Such centralization was dictated by the fleeting nature of modern combat. During a minimum time a captain must obtain the maximum information needed for making and carrying out his decisions. Automated control systems, electronic computers, and computing instruments are capable of the rapid processing of any information, making precise calculations, and thereby creating for the captain the conditions for creative and more effective work.

But this work is of quite a different and higher class than in the past. The main command post, which is now located inside the ship, hardly gives a captain a place for ideal (more convenient) thought. Now the captain primarily acts as an analyst working with abstract values. Of course, this speeds up the thought process, but at the same time does not release the captain from the job of always being keenly aware of the actual status of the battle.

Not understanding these qualitative changes in the operational duties of a captain means existing under yesterday's capabilities.

Armed warfare never has been purely technical or tactical in nature. This process is filled with social, ideological and psychological factors, the decisive role of which is well-known. And the changes in this sphere of command activities have been very significant.

The increased social responsibility of the man in charge of a modern ship for these changes is very significant. As we know, the fire power of one submarine equipped with nuclear missiles now exceeds in destructive capacity the capability of the artillery and airpower of all countries participating in World War II. An attack by a missile-carrying submarine against a ground target, carried out according to "the norms and rules of tactics," is capable of guaranteeing accomplishment of a strategic mission. And the captain of that vessel must not only perceive in general terms, but also thoroughly realize the magnitude of his responsibility to the country and the people. His responsibility has increased not only on a personal basis, but also for the whole crew and for their moral-political and combat qualities. This means that now, in the age of the wide use of weapons involving many operators, his role as an instructor of subordinates is more important than in the past. Thus, the demands placed on the ideological training, tactical skills and instructive ability of a commander continue to rise.

At sea, hundreds and thousands of miles from home shores, after making an important decision the captain of a Soviet ship frequently acts independently, having carefully considered the interests of the state. His authority must be very great. And basically the officer, who is ideologically mature, mentally strong, and also always seeks to comprehensively resolve the tasks involved in the political, military and moral education of people in an up-to-date manner, relies in work on the efforts and influence of party and Komsomol organizations, and effectively organizes socialist competition, possesses such authority. In this sphere there are also many new things, and a captain must perceive them and incorporate them in his arsenal.

The increased technical and power equipping of the modern ship, the variety of weapons, and their tremendous capabilities naturally have led to a rise in the intensity and dynamics of combat operations at sea. This compels a commander to even more energetically prepare himself and his crew at their base for meeting the enemy, and to persistently acquire skills through training exercises at sea. It is necessary to be able to rapidly analyze a huge number of likely situations, to change from one method to another, and to come up with the best application of weapons and equipment for performing each assignment.

There has been a step up in the work of the commander. For example, in the Ship Regulations the duties of the captain are set forth on 20 pages, and his widely varied duties encompass some 51 paragraphs. The duties of all other shipboard officers require only 45 paragraphs. A similar situation is found in other control documents.

The great distances at which ships operate from control centers and their home bases, as well as the length of sea voyages, play an essential role in the intensification of a captain's work. Many of the things usually handled by senior chiefs fall on the shoulders of the captain on a long voyage. Thus, the scope and intensity of his intellectual activity are significantly increased, while the time for analysis, conclusions, appraisal of a situation, and making decisions is sharply reduced.

The intensification of the captain's work is closely related to another feature of his current activities, namely to the objective need to participate in scientific tests.

Formerly, individual officers who had a particular bent for this type of work were involved in this. Especially since, as a rule, in the not too distant past everything new in tactics originated on the basis of acquired combat experience. With the absence of this experience only the results from training exercises and the conclusions and recommendations of people who actually use the newest in weaponry can lead to the development of a new operational technique or tactical procedure. It is not unusual, therefore, that now a captain-scientist is far from a rare occurrence and, in fact, normal. I personally know many officers, who, upon taking over a crew, began their scientific endeavors and achieved great success. Officer G. Karmenok, for example, became a doctor of naval sciences.

Today highly educated officers command Soviet ships. However, in itself an education merely opens the door for a thorough study of weapons and equipment, and a mastering of tactics: diligent, systematic and purposeful work is required. Effective ways and means of training ship captains have been developed for the period of rebuilding the fleet. They have begun to learn what specialists in a specific field knew previously: the theory of search, theory of control, nuclear physics, radio-electronics, oceanography, hydrology...

Such is what the present calls for. But to really respond to this need means showing real initiative, studying day after day, and supplementing official training methods with persistent independent training.

Of course, a ship captain is not obliged and cannot know everything that a specific specialist knows. The training of a ship captain is conducted based on the real potential of the man. But a captain must be an outstanding man, with clearly defined capabilities. And certainly one of his main assets, which is necessary for his rapid development, must be the ability to be aware of new things.

New things are not only seen 10 years ahead, they are all around us every day. And to observe new things on a small scale, indicates a feeling for the new at all levels.

At the 25th CPSU Congress it was emphasized that today's leader should basically bring together an adherence to party principles with complete competence, and discipline with initiative and a creative approach to work. These party standards also apply to military personnel. To fully live up to them -- this is what being in step with the times means.

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CSO: 1801

## NEW APPROACH TO IDEOLOGICAL-INDOCTRINATION WORK DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Sep 76 p 2

[Article by Colonel P. Shchekochikhin, inspector of the Ground Forces Political Directorate: "Taking into Account Growing Demands"]

[Text] When the conversation came around to problems related to the comprehensive approach to ideological-indoctrination work conducted in the battalion, my friends spoke with concern about the young officers. It was not difficult to understand their view.

There are many lieutenants in this group. They are competent people, who are well trained in military ways and have a good understanding of their work. In this respect the battalion commander Captain S. Krayushkin and his deputy commander for political affairs Captain G. Savchenko, as they say, have no real call for concern. Something else bothers them: some young officers master the methods and techniques involved in indoctrination work very slowly. As a rule, the lieutenants conduct planned exercises in combat training on a high instructional plane and are able to keep their subordinates interested. But the officers really do not clearly understand how to increase the educational role of exercises and competition, and how to basically combine the training process with indoctrination.

Of course this is one of the conditions of the comprehensive approach, and the extent to which it is implemented depends primarily on the level of training of the people involved in indoctrinating servicemen, as well as on their occupational and instructional competency and, in my opinion, their ability to conduct the work on a comprehensive basis. Naturally, the question arises: how is this necessary knowledge acquired? Some officers feel that it should come mainly from commander's talks, seminars and conferences held with various categories of commanders and political workers. Of course, these questions are raised at these gatherings and this represents a good way of providing this knowledge. But is it adequate?

Today it is necessary to raise the art of indoctrination to new heights. The volume and scope of ideological-indoctrination work are steadily growing. And only those people who possess the proper training and thoroughly understand the problems of teaching and psychology can cope with this work.



Such a yardstick was applied to the indoctrination people at a certain unit in the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District. Here matters on the comprehensive approach to the indoctrination of soldiers are constantly found in the work plans of the party bureau and Komsomol committee. Seminars with party activists and leaders of political instruction groups, as well as instructional-teaching sessions with commanders, do not avoid raising the question of how to go about interrelating the political, military, moral, legal and esthetic indoctrination of personnel during the training process. The content and results of fundamental work connected with using modern means of mass information, visual aids, and special publications are analyzed at seminars. These training sessions cover many subjects with debatable aspects. The men not only acquire knowledge, but also the desire for self-improvement is brought out in them. Thus it is no surprise that the officers in this unit, such as V. Kuchinskiy, I. Vinevskiy and A. Dolgushev are noted for their ability to effectively coordinate the efforts of commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations in the comprehensive handling of problems involving the indoctrination of personnel.

Now as never before, a basic knowledge of the organizational aspect of the comprehensive approach, its content, and methodology should be combined with a clear idea of its practical application. We frequently encounter a situation of this type. At a meeting an officer competently, adroitly and scientifically discusses the problems of strengthening the moral atmosphere within a military group, increasing the moral importance of a supervisor and aktiv, and anticipating any possibility of conflicting situations. One feels he has a good understanding of the theoretical problems. But, admittedly, this still does not guarantee an instructor success. It is still necessary to be able to apply the theoretical knowledge to practical situations.

Current conditions urgently require that officers master indoctrination methods in an organized and purposeful way while actually on the job.

In order for the commander and political worker to have a clear conception of the problems of the comprehensive approach, it is necessary to hold special seminar sessions, practical-scientific conferences, and individual discussions at units. And other training techniques which will help formulate in instructors the necessary skills for this complex work must be studied.

Here it is necessary to recognize that due mainly to inadequately considered and poorly directed training, some commanders, political organs, and party committees and bureaus are still slowly reorganizing their work in light of the requirement of the 25th CPSU Congress -- to resolve indoctrination tasks in a comprehensive manner. This, in turn, gives rise to a "less intense" feeling about the comprehensive approach among young commanders and political workers.

At a certain unit where Major G. Liviy is a member of the party bureau, talking goes on about the comprehensive approach. But there is nothing more than talk. Here there have been no seminars nor practical training sessions

with the officer, in fact, what people consider as the essence and content of the comprehensive approach were not even explained. Naturally, when we spoke with commanders and political workers, many of them displayed a superficial knowledge of this important matter. Thus, can we expect effective practical work from them?

Unfortunately, other situations have been encountered where some comrades, who want to demonstrate the scope of the ideological-indoctrination work, pursue overly broad measures and "general coverage." Thus, another important factor is overlooked -- the individual approach to indoctrinating servicemen. Indeed, it is impossible to discuss the comprehensive effect on men without this. Such a situation, for example, exists at the subunit where Senior Lieutenant V. Marchenko is serving. In leaning toward mass measures, little interest has been generated in individual indoctrination work in this group. This technique has been primarily associated with "reprimanding" soldiers who have broken the rules, overlooking an important fact: when we speak about analyzing people, we are not only involved in trying to prevent negative situations. Another important approach is the examining of the positive traits of a person, and assisting in the development of good habits.

Ignorance of advanced teaching techniques, the inadequate outfitting of some units with special training aids, and the lack of proper conditions for officers' independent training are also obstacles to improving the effectiveness of the indoctrination process. Taking into account the requirements of the 25th CPSU Congress, it seems the time is now ripe for better fundamental training of students and trainees at military training institutions in the subjects of pedagogy, psychology and military ethics. While in the field one hears complaints from young officers, that these disciplines are not studied in senior courses, and that for some reason the subject of individual indoctrination work with subordinates is not even provided for at higher military-political schools. It is difficult to explain why military ethics until now has not occupied its proper place in training programs. It is simply impossible for today's commander and political worker to effectively deal with the problems of training and indoctrinating servicemen without bringing together and practically applying the concepts of military teaching and military ethics.

The comprehensive approach places very high demands on the teacher. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct the training of regular military personnel for this work also in a comprehensive way, taking into consideration the new tasks in the field of communist indoctrination which were set down for us by the 25th CPSU Congress.

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CSO: 1801

## VIEWS ON PROPER COMBAT TRAINING OF AIR DEFENSE OFFICERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Sep 76 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Arty N. Rudenko: "Training. What Should It Be?"]

[Text] The situation on the tactical exercises was complex. In trying to break through to the defended objective "enemy" aviation attempted to neutralize the air defense means. "Fires" broke out at the firing position of the antiaircraft missile battalion commanded by Major G. Labo. According to the special situation of the checkers, some of the personnel were "put out of action." Nevertheless, the subunit managed to defeat the plans of the opposing side. The "enemy" airplanes invariably encountered an insurmountable barrier of fire in their path.

What was it that helped the missilemen to accomplish the assigned mission? Improved equipment, high combat ability, and the clear actions of the sections? Yes, all this unquestionably contributed to success. An exceptionally important role was played by the high level of tactical training of the battalion commander. He divined the "enemy's" intentions exactly and adopted decisive and effective countermeasures. The confident actions of Major Labo were based on a deep understanding of the nature of contemporary combat with the aerial enemy, good knowledge of tactics, and the ability to apply this knowledge in a practical manner for an analysis of the situation which has developed and to make the optimum decision.

Major Labo acquired and deepened the necessary knowledge and skills in the course of training drills. They play an important role in the combat training of the missilemen. The fact that the drills should be conducted under conditions which are as close as possible to combat conditions causes no doubts in anyone. And all commanders strive for this. However, the goal is not always attained. You see how with one commander the bursts thunder on almost every drill, and flames rage at the firing position, and "malfunctions" appear in the materiel one after the other. However, the training of the sections and its preparation per se grow slowly. Why? You begin a detailed study of the course of the lessons and practically always you come to one and the same conclusion: the tactical basis of the drill's concept is divorced from possible situations of actual combat with an aerial enemy.

One day, we analyzed the actions of Captain A. Petrov during a drill. In performing the duties of the launcher control officer he committed a number of errors in conducting fire against a maneuvering target. The capabilities of the antiaircraft missile complex were not completely utilized by the officer.

It would be unfair to reproach Captain Petrov for poor knowledge of the equipment and weak tactical training. He took part in many drills. Then why did the annoying failure occur?

"I never once encountered such a situation," the officer admitted frankly.

What a pity! The nature of the terrain and other features suggested that in breaking through to the defended objective the enemy would certainly attempt to employ just such a maneuver. However, neither Captain Petrov himself nor those who directly supervised his training considered this in organizing the drills. Of course, firing at maneuvering targets was worked out in the subunit, but "in general," and not specifically.

The question arises: will not drills in special versions which reflect the specific features of a given subunit engender becoming accustomed to stereotype and inhibit the development of tactical thinking of the commander? It is believed that there are no grounds for such doubts. Permit me to refer to the experience of the same Major Labo whom we have already discussed. In organizing lessons with his subordinates and planning his own training, the battalion commander always took many factors into consideration: the composition of the "enemy's" forces and means, the relief of the terrain, and the nature of possible jamming. He also considered the time which would be at his disposal to prepare to repel the attack and the special features of coordination with adjacent subunits. In other words, Major Labo tried to imagine ahead of time all the "fine points" of the forthcoming battle.

However, the officer never relied on the 100-percent correctness of his assumptions. He understood that it is impossible to envision absolutely everything and that in the course of battle initial versions will probably require adjustments. Nevertheless, Major Labo correctly assumed that it is much simpler and faster to introduce changes in his decision than to start everything from scratch.

We recall the years of the Great Patriotic War. In preparing for an offensive or to repel enemy attacks each commander, considering the assigned mission and utilizing data from combat reconnaissance and his own observations of the enemy, planned the actions of the unit or subunit entrusted to him ahead of time. Does this mean that actual combat will correspond exactly to the "scenario" which has been developed? Of course not! No one counted on it. But all the same, the basis of control always was the decision prepared ahead of time. I believe that under contemporary conditions such preliminary work by the commander has acquired even greater significance.

Actually, in our time combat, especially with an aerial enemy, is characterized by fluidity, a high level of dynamism, and the employment of varied technical means on broad scales. Under these conditions the requirements imposed on the commander--the organizer and director of the battle-- are increasing. As a rule, his activity proceeds under conditions of an acute shortage of time. Literally in seconds, he is required to make an estimate of the situation and to make and realize the optimum decision which ensures the unconditional accomplishment of the combat mission.

I recall that the following special situation was heard on one of the tactical exercises: an "enemy" airplane which was already in the zone of fire launched an antiradar homing missile. An exceptionally complex dilemma faced Captain V. Malyauk who was performing the duties of launcher control officer. He could adopt urgent measures to deflect the strike against the battalion. And he could shoot down the "enemy" airplane but "perish" in so doing. It would seem that there was no third way out of the situation which had developed. But the officer found it.

Making an estimate of the situation from the scope's screen, he instantaneously performed the required calculations in his mind and came to the conclusion that he would manage to destroy the target and only after this he would adopt measures to prevent the strike of the antiradar missile. The appropriate commands were heard in the quiet of the van. And the concept was completely successful. The "enemy" aircraft was shot down and the battalion could continue to repel the attack. It remains to be added to what was said above that Captain Malyauk had no more than three seconds at his disposal to make an estimate of the situation and make a decision.

Would this time have been enough if he had not been internally prepared for such a turn of events? Hardly. But, as was learned, on the drills which preceded the tactical exercise all possible versions of battle were worked out in detail. Among them was the one which envisaged a duel between the battalion and an "enemy" antiradar missile. It was then, in the course of daily training, that the officer acquired the needed skills. The organizers of the drills always strived to recreate the dynamics of contemporary battle with the aerial enemy and to reproduce the actual tactical procedures which he employs using simulation equipment.

Practice shows that the organizer of a drill should also be a good methodologist in addition to having a deep understanding of the nature of contemporary battle. In mastering newer and newer procedures for repelling attacks, it should always be kept in mind that firm practical skills are acquired with the strict observance of the optimum periodicity of drills and the mandatory repetition of what has been covered.

The experience of Lieutenant Colonel N. Galushkin is instructive in this regard. As a rule, he conducts the drills every other day. Each of them lasts for at least two hours, in which regard 60 percent of the time is allotted to "polishing" problems which were worked out earlier. The director creates a

difficult situation which is changed each time. This contributes to the development of the tactical thinking of the officers and forces them to accomplish the assigned missions creatively. And it is believed that just such an approach to the organization of drills permits the subunit to accomplish live firings successfully and to win the title of outstanding for many years in a row.

I should like to stress especially that an important role in each drill is played by its concluding stage--the critique. It is not by chance that I consider it as a component part of the drill itself. Unfortunately, it still happens that when summing up results they only mention the names of those who distinguished themselves and those who committed blunders. Let me say directly that with such an approach to matters the instructiveness and effectiveness of the lesson which has taken place are cut in half. And on the contrary, with a detailed and thoughtful analysis and effective propagandizing of leading experience and with the disclosure of the true reasons for the mistakes which were committed the critique is turned into a school of combat skill.

A profound analysis of the results of the drills which have been conducted will also help the staff which is planning combat training. It cannot be excluded that on the basis of an analysis the conclusion will be drawn concerning the necessity for repeated working out of individual subjects. Along with this, a situation may develop where some of them will be mastered earlier than the times initially planned. In these cases, is it expedient to be guided automatically by the existing plan? It probably can and should be subjected to adjustments in the interests of the high-quality and rapid accomplishment of all combat-training missions.

The problem of improving the instructiveness and effectiveness of drills and improving the tactical ability of commanders has important significance. Many young officers were assigned to higher duties comparatively recently. They are commanding regiments, battalions, and batteries, are mastering duties which are new for them, and are training themselves and their subordinates for combat with a strong, technically equipped enemy. The thoughtful organization of drills will help them to acquire combat skill more rapidly.

One other thing should be remembered. The process of the further improvement of armament and persistent searches for new methods for its employment are continuing. What could satisfy the leader of battle yesterday inevitably becomes obsolete tomorrow. This obliges commanders and staffs to approach drills creatively and with consideration of the latest achievements of military science and technology.

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CSO: 1801

## TRAINING OF MEDICAL AID PERSONNEL DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Sep 76 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Med Serv V. Mikhaylov and Col Med Serv M. Gogolev: "In the Ranks of the Medical Detachments"]

[Excerpts] Members of medical detachments made a large contribution to the elimination of the aftereffects of natural disasters. During the earthquakes in Tashkent and Gazli, for example, they rendered first aid to victims and participated in their evacuation, conducted medical-educational work, and conducted medical inspections among the population who were taken out of the areas of the earthquakes and housed in tent cities. The members of the medical detachments disclosed the sick among the population and monitored the feeding points which were set up temporarily and the water supply.

Medical detachments are created at installations of the national economy, in institutions and educational facilities, in kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and on transportation. They include able-bodied girls and women who have taken special training in accordance with a 40-hour program.

It is also worth mentioning one aspect of the activity of members of medical detachments in peacetime. This is participation in combating road and transport accidents. In this regard, good experience has been accumulated, for example, in the Lithuanian SSR. The first road medical posts were created in Shilutskiy rayon back in 1965. Now they are found in all rayons of the republic.

Great significance in the quality training of medical detachments and instilling practical skills in them is had by the organization of lessons with them and the attraction of trained teachers from among medical personnel for their conduct.

Here, main emphasis is placed on practical instruction. Theoretical lessons are conducted to the extent necessary for the members of the medical detachments to accomplish practical procedures confidently when rendering first aid and caring for victims.

In the training of the medical detachments as paramilitary civil defense formations special attention is paid to putting them together and to instilling lofty moral and psychological qualities in them. This is attained by attracting them to participation in special tactical exercises and in competitions and complex civil defense installation training exercises. On them, the medical detachments operate in a specific situation which is close to one of combat and work out problems on organizing the search, conducting initial classification, and rendering first aid to victims. The members of the medical detachments learn coordinated actions together with engineer, rescue, fire-fighting, and other civil defense formations.

An effective form for improving practical skills of members of the medical detachments which has shown up in a good light over a number of years is the competitions of the medical detachments. They are conducted at installations and in rayons, cities of oblast subordination, and in oblasts and krays. The effectiveness of the competition is ensured because the medical detachments which participate in them work out all the program problems sequentially, by stages, in practice.

The competitions have earned the right to be called combat inspections of the readiness of the medical detachments. Unfortunately, they still are not always and everywhere conducted in accordance with the requirements set forth in the statute on them. Thus, sometimes on the competitions conditions are not created for the strained work of the medical detachments. Sometimes practical work in stricken areas is replaced by theoretical talks and stricken areas are not simulated with sufficient completeness.

It is believed that the practice should be abandoned where a sufficient number of extras are not allotted to the medical detachment in a nuclear stricken area or in an area stricken with chemical contamination for drills in rendering first aid.

The members of the medical detachments should possess such qualities as bravery, resoluteness, and efficiency in evaluating the nature of the injury and rendering assistance. All these qualities can be developed only on practical lessons which are conducted without simplification and indulgences.

The readiness of the medical detachments depends not only on their state of training and solidarity, but also on their equipment with the necessary materials for rendering first aid and with individual protective means. Responsibility for providing the medical detachments with equipment is borne by the supervisors of the installations of the national economy and the institutions where they are created.

Great and important tasks are assigned to the medical detachments. Naturally, first aid in centers of mass destruction can be effective only under the condition where it is rendered at the earliest possible times and directly at the site of the injury. This obliges the appropriate supervisors to train the medical detachments not for rendering first aid in general but with consideration of the accomplishment of a certain volume of work in established times.



Especially good results in the sense of instilling practical skills in the members of the medical detachments for the care of casualties are brought by lessons which are conducted on a base of medical institutions. This is proven, in particular, by the experience of the Leningrad city committee of the Red Cross Society where such lessons are widely practiced.

The members of the medical detachments are called upon to accomplish important tasks both in peacetime and in time of war. And their successful training can be ensured only by the joint coordinated efforts of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, civil defense staffs, and public health organs.

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CSO: 1801

## VIEWS ON COMMAND TRAINING OF YOUNG OFFICERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Sep 76 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen Arty M. Sitnikov, chief of staff of the Red Banner Baku Air Defense District: "...Plus the Predecessor's Experience"]

[Text] Continuity of leadership--this is the most important principle of the party's personnel policy. Worked out by many generations of Soviet people, the experience of directing economic and cultural construction is the base on which the creative successes of our people are multiplied. In full measure, the principle of continuity in leadership also pertains to military personnel. Young commanders of units and subunits are carrying the baton given to them by the veterans in a worthy manner.

It is completely natural that young commanders sometimes do not have enough practical experience and skills in the effective training and upbringing of subordinates. Therefore, at first they have a special need for assistance on the part of more experienced commanders, staffs, and political organs. And in my opinion, this assistance should begin with a mandatory talk with the newly arrived officer by the senior commander.

This conversation should not be conducted formally, for the sake of extremely general and strictly official parting words as sometimes happens. Frankness, specificity, good will--these, in my opinion, are its distinguishing features. It is very important that the young officer receive a clear impression of the state of affairs in the subunits, level of training of his subordinates, and the most noteworthy features of his predecessor's work style in the training and education of the soldiers. At the same time, those difficulties which await the officer at his new place of service should also be discussed. It is not out of place to recall the importance of the high authority of the commander which must be gained by persistent, daily labor, ideological maturity, a high level of professional training, and constant demandingness toward himself and toward his subordinates which is combined with concern for people.

Not so long ago, for example, the subordinates of Captain A. Morozov proved themselves outstandingly in the course of live firings on the range. This success became possible primarily thanks to the ability of Captain Morozov

to conduct daily lessons and drills in such a way that they were filled with the breath of contemporary battle. Nor is it less important to note another aspect of his commander's activity: the ability quickly to find his place in the new collective and to organize the harmonious, coordinated work of his subordinates which is directed toward the attainment of even higher results in soldierly labor. And again, which is especially important, Captain Morozov assimilated and utilized in full measure everything of value from the work experience of his predecessor.

Unfortunately, it also happens that a new commander begins his work as if from scratch and ignores everything which was achieved before him, and he thereby not only casts a shadow on his predecessor but he also inflicts harm on matters.

The following case is recalled. Visiting one of the radio subunits, a commission from higher headquarters disclosed serious shortcomings in the training and education of the personnel. What had happened? For formerly this subunit had the reputation as one of the best. They began to look into the matter. It was learned that Captain K. Yevstigneyev who had been appointed commander of this subunit had not been able to establish firm, businesslike contact with his closest assistants and did not consider it necessary to consult with them.

Nor did Captain Yevstigneyev consider what in my view is such a very important psychological detail as the attachment of the soldiers to their former commander, Lieutenant Colonel I. Tret'yakov, and their having become accustomed already to his even demandingness and thoughtful approach to the solution of all problems. Therefore, it is believed that some of their restraint in regard to their new commander appeared to be completely natural. Captain Yevstigneyev interpreted this restraint in his own way, wrongly. Apparently, in the heat of wounded pride he declared at a party meeting: everything which had occurred under Tret'yakov should be forgotten; we will begin to work in a new way. It is not difficult to imagine the "buoyant" attitude with which the communists of the subunit dispersed after these words.

Bewilderment was caused in the collective by the decision of the commander to propose as a candidate for entry into the academy an officer who in no way proved himself in service or, for example, to forbid all active duty servicemen without exception to leave the area of the subunit "in connection with an approaching inspection...."

The unreasoned attitude in these and other decisions, the arrogant attitude of Captain Yevstigneyev toward the experience of his predecessor and the entire collective, and his striving to keep people at a distance led to where an unhealthy situation was created in the subunit. But you see, everything might have developed differently if the young commander, as they say, did not run to arrogance, began his activity with a thorough study of the state of affairs in the subunit, and had relied more on his deputy for political affairs and the chief of staff--experienced officers who know their business well. It also would have been worthwhile for the captain to analyze the methods for educational work which were used by his more experienced predecessor in a thoughtful manner.

One day, the unit commander admitted to me "in secret": he formerly sent the most fired-up lieutenants to Tret'yakov. Two of them are already finishing the academy. Two others are successfully commanding subunits.

In short, Lieutenant Colonel Tret'yakov's successor could have learned something from him. If he had even looked in the worn notebooks where the lieutenant colonel had entered information about his subordinates, plans, and notes on various service matters. Tret'yakov had left these notebooks in the desk. But the young commander also started with a new desk....

I long recalled the words which an honored military leader addressed to us, at that time graduates of the academy: "Learn from your predecessors," he said. "Also learn from their successes and mistakes. Even if their energy and enthusiasm decreased with age. In return, don't become preoccupied with the experience of service or worldly wisdom. Try to adopt this experience...."

Unfortunately, this valuable thought is not always heard at assemblies, seminars, and other measures intended for the training of young commanders. It stands to reason that the presentations of leading officers who share their experience in the training and education of their subordinates are also needed, of course. Lectures on military pedagogy and psychology are necessary. No less important, it is believed, is the experience which has, so to speak, a specific "survey tie-in"--the experience of the commander-predecessor. This is a unique treasure which is readily available and which need only be used skillfully.

In the N-th antiaircraft missile unit, for example, a good reputation is enjoyed by the subunit commanded by Captain P. Khotnyanskiy. The soldiers of this collective take precedence in socialist competition. A healthy, creative atmosphere reigns here and all combat-training missions are accomplished successfully.

Meanwhile, the beginning of the commander biography of Captain Khotnyanskiy was not easy. Some of the officers of the subunit, apparently, considered that with the arrival of the young commander they could give themselves an easy time. The behavior of Captain A. Rodnikov, let us say, greatly concerned Khotnyanskiy. An excellent specialist and master of combat qualifications who headed the best section in the unit from the results of combat work, he began to display arrogance more and more and was late to formation twice. And the same answer to reproofs: you're carping at me for trifles, he says.

What is to be done? Punish the officer strictly? However, a "sixth sense" suggested to Captain Khotnyanskiy: Rodnikov will draw into himself even more and will become sullen. A different path is needed. The commander turned for advice to Major A. Obraztsov and Captain Yu. Sochilin, respected communists in the subunit. They said: "Let us do what your predecessor did in such situations,--let us turn to the opinion of the collective."

At a meeting of the officers they listened to Captain Rodnikov concerning his performance of his service duties. Major Obraztsov set the tone of the conversation. Then Sochilin and Senior Lieutenant V. Zhuravlev spoke.... But now

not individual "fault-finding" of the new commander--Captain Rodnikov felt the unanimous condemnation of the officers in the course of this frank conversation. It was something for him to think about seriously. And from that day, Captain Khotnyanskiy found even firmer support among the communists and in the collective.

I should like to mention something else. An officer who genuinely loves the service and who, as they say, is anxious about it, thinks not only about seeing that affairs in the subunit proceed well, but also of the day when a new commander will arrive to replace him. How will mutual relations with subordinates develop with his successor? Will the subunit lose the positions which it has won? These questions should worry each officer. It is easiest of all, having accomplished the proper formalities, to turn over the subunit and be done with it. However, party and service duty enjoin each officer to do everything possible to facilitate the formation of the young commander and to help him to understand the matters of the people and the collective in a short time and affirm his authority among them.

It should be said, by the way, that in turning over a subunit the former commander helped his successor, Captain Khotnyanskiy, to look into the characters and professional qualities of his subordinates, told about shortcomings present in the training of some of the sections, interested himself in his plans, and expressed some useful advice. All this helped Captain Khotnyansky, as they say, to avoid wandering around in the dark on the first days, to find the correct tone at once in his relations with subordinates, and to organize harmonious, coordinated work in the collective.

Of course, it is not always possible for the former and the new commander to talk eye to eye so thoroughly. It happens that an officer is assigned to a vacant higher post. But even in this case, it is believed, an objective approach will permit noting the characteristic features of his predecessor's work style. Much that is useful can be learned from talks with the former commander's deputies and with other officers of the subunit. And there is no need to be ashamed of these talks, erroneously assuming that in some way they adversely affect your official authority. On the contrary, this will strengthen the confidence of the subordinates in the new commander even more and will bring him spiritually closer to them.

The young must step farther. Perhaps, on even more difficult roads than the veterans who have performed their period of service. Because military affairs are continuously improving and the requirements imposed on the level of professional training of military personnel and their moral-political and psychological qualities are becoming ever more rigid. Therefore, it is very important that the young commanders take their first steps with firm confidence in success, continuing and multiplying the soldierly deeds of their predecessors in a worthy manner.

## MILITARY APPLICATION OF AUTOMATIC CONTROL SYSTEMS EVALUATED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Sep 76 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen Arty A. Smirnov: "Effectiveness of Combat Control"]

[Text] At the 25th Congress of the CPSU, great attention was devoted to the further improvement of control of the national economy, the special urgency of this problem at the contemporary stage was stressed, and basic ways for its solution were determined. The party's instructions on this problem are also a guide to action for military personnel.

The deep transformations in military affairs, the qualitative changes in the technical equipping of the troops, and the continuous improvement of the forms and methods for the conduct of armed conflict are increasing the requirements for the combat control of units and subunits. The span of tasks which the commander and staff must accomplish in the planning, organization, and conduct of battle have also expanded considerably and become more complicated.

The National Air Defense Troops must be ready to repel an attack of an aerial enemy at any moment. The law of their life is constant combat readiness and the highest vigilance. The factor of time has most important significance for the National Air Defense Troops. All this, in turn, imposes special, extremely rigid requirements on the organization and implementation of the combat control of troops and its effectiveness.

What should be understood by effectiveness of control? The ability to adopt and implement decisions in the prescribed times which ensure the unconditional accomplishment of the combat mission to destroy the enemy. It must be stressed especially that the commander, as a rule, has an extremely limited time to make his decision and realize it in specific actions. This is caused by the nature of contemporary battle with the aerial enemy and by the high degree of dynamism and the rapid development of events in the course of it. And it is here that automated control systems (ASU) come to our aid.

Time and again officer N. Sechkin headed a section during strained tactical exercises and drills. And each time the assigned mission was accomplished with a high grade. What ensured success? Deep knowledge and firm practical skills,

the good coordination of the section? Unquestionably. But also to a no lesser degree the officer's skillful use of an automated control system. He mastered it to perfection and is constantly looking for new, most effective methods of combat employment. And such an approach to the matter predetermines high results in considerable measure.

Practice shows that automation is the main and most effective way to increase the effectiveness of the control process and its efficiency. In actual combat, automated systems collect and analyze initial data, generate a decision, assign missions to executors, and check their results. All this occurs rapidly and is mathematically substantiated. This ensures the most complete and optimum use of air defense forces and means from the tactical point of view and the organization of coordination is facilitated.

Does this mean that it only remains for the commander to follow the instrument readings and the illuminated display and to press the button in time? By no means. The complexity of contemporary battle requires automation of the control process and the consideration of every possible version of combat actions. But automation does not replace the commander; it frees him from computational work. Consequently, the use of the ASU changes the content of the commander's activity in troop control in a qualitative manner.

Effectiveness of control depends essentially on the level of training and the degree of experience of commanders and staffs and the coordination of the command post combat sections. The new equipment required that more attention be devoted to the training of staff and command-post officers as ASU operators. It is important that the actions of all specialists of the combat sections be clear, efficient, and timely. It cannot be allowed that the time gained through the speed of electronic computers is lost due to the slowness and insufficient training of the officers.

Unfortunately, individual commanders are not able to make a correct assessment of the role of automation of control. Some, relying totally and completely on equipment, decrease demandingness toward themselves and are not sufficiently concerned about the growth of their tactical skill. Others do not succeed in overcoming the force of inertia and stepping over a unique psychological barrier for a long time. They theoretically admit the importance of introducing automated control systems but in practice their attitude toward them is one of a certain lack of confidence. But this cannot bring success under contemporary conditions.

As an example, shortcomings in the actions of the subordinates of officer Yu. Shumov were disclosed in the course of one of the tactical exercises. The essence of these shortcomings was reduced to the fact that in individual cases the capabilities of the armament were not completely realized in the destruction of "enemy" airplanes at great distances and altitudes. Subsequent analysis permitted establishing the true reasons for this.

It turned out that Comrade Shumov did not make complete or careful use of the automated system which he had at his disposal. And the aerial situation was

rather complex. All this led to where under conditions of an acute shortage of time the officer at times made late and moreover sometimes insufficiently well grounded decisions.

What is it that hinders some commanders in overcoming this psychological barrier and employing contemporary means of combat control skillfully and effectively? You begin to examine the matter and, as a rule, it is determined that the sources of such conservatism are hidden in weak knowledge of the equipment and its capabilities and in the absence of firm practical skills in working on it.

True, commanders who underestimate the role, place, and advantages of ASU in the combat control process gradually revise their opinions as their professional skill grows and change their attitude toward technical means. However, in a number of cases this process is dragged out impermissibly, which contradicts the interests of the further strengthening of combat readiness. Consequently, the study and practical mastery of automated systems cannot be allowed to drift.

Unquestionably, it is difficult to give any single recommendations pertaining to the most rational methods for mastering ASU's. Each unit and each subunit has its own specific features caused by the nature of the missions to be accomplished, the level of training of the personnel, and a whole number of other factors. Nevertheless, in my opinion, some general procedures exist to which it is expedient to adhere.

First of all, an officer who is not familiar with the ASU should study the principles of operation of the automated device and the methods for displaying information and he should master the equipment which has a direct relation to a given work site. When this task has been basically accomplished, he can begin to work on the coordination of the command post combat section. And finally, the concluding stage--consolidating practical skills in the combat control of all functionaries in the period of drills and tactical exercises.

In speaking about the study and practical mastery of the ASU, I should like to stress that an important role in this matter is had by the personal example of the commander. In this regard, we are speaking not only of his persistence, purposefulness, and industriousness, but also of the nature of specific actions on exercises and drills and about the atmosphere which reigns at them.

It still happens at times that a commander, having received exhaustive data from a computer, immediately begins to inquire about something by telephone, to verify, and to double check. It cannot be excluded that in some special situations this actually must be done. But if such actions become part of the system they inevitably begin to have a psychological effect on all personnel of the section. They say, if the commander has doubts, then can I trust what the computer "says?" You look, and the stream of all possible additional requests and reports which are absolutely unnecessary begins to grow, as if a snowball, reducing to naught all the advantages of the automated system.



Thus, in being concerned about raising professional skill, we should not forget for a minute about the education of people, about inculcating in them the correct views on the significance and capabilities of contemporary technical means of control of battle.

Unquestionably, each officer who is part of a command post section is required to master to perfection the automated devices at his work site. But special requirements in this regard are imposed on the chief of staff. He is the support of the commander in creative activity in the control of the battle. Success in the accomplishment of the combat mission depends to a great extent on his training and activity.

Officer S. Trubachev, chief of staff of the N-th unit, expended much effort on mastering the automated control system. Now his labor is being repaid with interest. Using data from computers competently, he makes a rapid estimate of the situation, generates suggestions for the commander to make a decision, and skillfully uses the capabilities of the ASU in the control of combat operations. Officer Trubachev is distinguished by the ability to solve problems which have suddenly arisen in short times and to create a calm, business-like atmosphere at the command post.

In considering questions of increasing the effectiveness of combat control, it should also be kept in mind that the ASU's should always be in a technically serviceable and combat-ready condition and ensure the maximum use of the troops' capabilities, the performance of combat duty, and the conduct of exercises and drills in accordance with the plans for combat training. These requirements impose a special responsibility on engineers and technicians. Many of them are conducting a constant creative search which is directed toward ensuring the operational reliability of the equipment, improving the survivability of the system, and the search for new, most effective methods for its combat use, servicing, and maintenance.

Increasing the effectiveness of combat control is the most important condition for the further strengthening of the combat readiness of units and subunits. Therefore, all measures are being undertaken so that this task is accomplished in a business-like manner, creatively, and on a scientific basis.

6367

CSO: 1801

# COMMANDER OF MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPANY CRITIQUES UNIT'S TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Sep 76 p 2

[Article by Sr Lt V. Meshkov, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Quality--A Specific Concept"]

[Text] The training year is close to completion. And although the main examination--the final check--is ahead, one can already judge conclusively about the effectiveness of soldierly labor on many sectors. Can judge fundamentally, self-critically, as is dictated by the growing requirements for combat readiness and the interests of the matter. It is from just such positions that the commander of a motorized rifle company, Senior Lieutenant V. Meshkov, evaluates some of the aspects of combat training in his letter to the editors.

The tactical exercise is an examination which is not forgotten for a long time. I also recall in all its details the last exercise with live firing which was conducted with our company. We accomplished the mission successfully. However, we didn't get by without the annoying "buts."

The third platoon under the command of Lieutenant V. Yakovlev was late in reaching the line of deployment into a company assault line formation. In the platoon, they did not maintain the correct intervals between the soldiers. It was obvious how much more clearly and smoothly the platoon commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Mikhaylov operated. It was necessary to concentrate all attention on the left flank and expend much energy in order to rectify the situation. Of course, Yakovlev deserved the reproach. But I also felt guilty myself.

As always, the exercise was preceded by tactical and marching drill exercises. And if Senior Lieutenant Mikhaylov displayed high demandingness toward then and achieved maximum clarity from his subordinates in the accomplishment of each element, Lieutenant Yakovlev was far from so consistent. He assigned himself a modest mission: to see that the platoon conformed to the time norms, and he paid no attention to the numerous errors in the accomplishment of tactical procedures. Noticing this, I gave the platoon commander a reprimand, gave him

necessary methodological recommendations and...switched over to other matters. Judging from everything, Yakovlev just could not improve his work methods. Prior to the exercise, all platoons had equal opportunities but they used them differently. The work effectiveness of the officers turned out to be different, which was also revealed with special obviousness on the exercise.

I also drew some deep conclusions for myself after another instance. On night firings, the grenade launcher operators of the platoon commanded by Lieutenant S. Okhapkin did not cope with their mission. What was the reason? In looking into it, I established that on drill lessons the lieutenant intentionally did not take the night sights: he did not want to calibrate them or be bothered with storage batteries. On the check firing, they had the occasion to accomplish an exercise namely with night sights. As a rule, the young grenade launcher operators did not know how to use them. I understood: if my check of the quality of the lessons had been more thorough, everything would have turned out differently. And the soldiers would have mastered the weapon more rapidly, and Lieutenant Okhapkin would have learned to approach the training of his subordinates with a greater sense of responsibility.

Many episodes which convince us that the quality of the lessons depends to a decisive degree on the experience, persistence, and industriousness of each of us officers can be presented. And it would appear that a simple and clear task follows from this: to implement a strict check, impose high demands on each of the commanders, improve the methodological skill of the commanders, and bring them up in a spirit of party responsibility for the entrusted matter. But everything turns out to be more difficult in practice. At times you see that one lesson or another was not properly prepared, that it is hardly possible to conduct it on the level of contemporary requirements, but you are forced to resign yourself to this and, consequently, forego quality.

Here is only one prosaic fact. An important lesson was forthcoming. There would be no coping with it without a quality lesson plan. And the day before there were day and night firings. The officers returned from the rifle range late at night. And only after this did they sit down to prepare the lesson plans. Could I demand that the lesson plans be exemplary? And this, I stress, is not the only case when, not through their own fault, the officers undertake the preparation of the forthcoming lessons after "all clear" was declared in the company.

I anticipate the question: then why is the training process planned so irrationally, why are the supervisors of the lessons deprived of the time to prepare for them. Unfortunately, here little depends on the company commander. The subjects of the lessons, their sequence and duration in working them out for each day of the week are determined by battalion headquarters. The company commander does not have the right to rearrange or change something in the company schedule. What arrived from the chief of staff is mechanically transferred to the prescribed schedule form. What this leads to was mentioned above.

By the way, on the day that the lesson plans had to be prepared at night, the headquarters allotted the company two hours for daytime firing. It was obvious that this was not enough, that not everything could be done in this time. And that is what happened. With the permission of the battalion commander firing continued after dinner. And then the time for a night lesson approached. If the company commanders had taken a larger part in the planning, there would have been no costs of this type.

It often happens that in the course of a day you move with the company from one training site to another four or five times, in so doing losing valuable time and ending some lessons prematurely. And again, there is one reason--a formal approach to planning.

It is poor when the struggle for quality is reduced to appeals. Integrated, all-embracing organizational work is much more necessary. Sometimes, with every desire it is impossible to conduct the lesson on a high level. For example, three hours were allotted by the program for working out the subject "The organization, improvement, and camouflage of positions." On a three-hour lesson one can talk, and demonstrate, and drill, and organize a competition for the best accomplishment of the norms, and personally evaluate the abilities of each one. But the battalion staff ordered the conduct of three one-hour lessons. I will say directly, the lessons turned out to be neither interesting nor instructive. The stamp of haste lay on them, and much was simulated rather than worked out. An undesirable stratification is obtained: shortcomings in methodological training of the young officers are reinforced by flaws in planning. But even this is not all.

The quality of training is greatly affected by the frequent tearing of the officers of the company away from the lessons. In order to convoy four vehicles from the regiment to the repair shop the commander of a platoon which had no relation to these vehicles was put in charge. During the firings, Lieutenant Yakovlev was required to be engaged in cordoning off the area. He left the platoon for the entire day. The importance of observing safety measures on the rifle range and the rules for operating motor transport is clear, but they also could have been ensured without taking the commanders from the lessons.

We cannot speak of the quality of the lessons without referring to the condition of the training material base. For example, it is difficult to employ advanced methodological procedures on the firing grounds of our regiment. You always feel disappointment on the lessons. A large part of the equipment stands idle. In particular, not one of the aiming rests which are available on the grounds is operating. The conversation often turned to this at party meetings. However, the problem has not yet been solved. Therefore, instead of consistent, systematic instruction, in a number of cases they are unduly absorbed by firing with live cartridges.

The shortcomings which we are discussing may appear to be individual cases which do not have decisive significance. Eventually the company, just as the majority of the subunits of the regiment, completes the training year in a

worthy manner. However, it is believed that primary attention should be devoted to just these shortcomings when summing up the results. For there are unused reserves behind them. And we will succeed in realizing them in the future only in the case where what has been achieved is evaluated self-critically and exactly, through the prism of quality indices.

6367

CSO: 1801

## TRAINING OF AIRBORNE TROOPS DESCRIBED

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 10 Oct 76 pp 508-518

[Article by Colonel Erich Sobik, GSC: "The Soviet Airborne Forces-- Training and Equipment Emphasize 'Priority of Attack'"]

[Text] The Soviets must undoubtedly be credited with the idea of developing airborne forces. On 2 August 1975, the Soviet Union celebrated the 45th Anniversary of its airborne forces. During maneuvers south of Moscow on 2 August 1930, a lieutenant and his platoon--for the first time in military history--attacked and captured an army HQ after having landed from the air. This event is considered the birthday of the Soviet airborne forces.

This beginning was followed during the next several years by a series of spectacular events, promoted by Marshal of the Soviet Union Tukhachevskiy who undoubtedly was also influenced by his training in Germany:

The first airborne brigade was organized in 1932.

A 900-man airborne detachment was dropped in the autumn of 1934 in the course of maneuvers in the Byelorussian Military District.

One year later, the airborne forces participated with 2,500 men in maneuvers in the Ukraine.

In the autumn of 1936, foreign military observers, in the Kiev area, were shown for the first time how about 1,200 paratroopers jumped over an airfield, captured it, and then facilitated the landing of another 5,000 men.

During the same year, about 4,000 men, with all their weapons and equipment, were airlifted from Moscow to Vladivostok--a spectacular event unparalleled at that time.

One might think that, in view of these preparations, Soviet airborne forces during World War II played a certain role. But that is not at all the case. To be sure, Soviet military writers emphasize again and again the "great successes during the Fatherland War"; but there is no denying that the Soviet airborne forces during World War II simply did not have any victories to record. In his book "Die Sowjetarmee, Wesen und Lehre" [The Soviet Army--Essence and Theory], R. L. Garthoff clearly described the

failures of the Soviets. On pages 402 and 403 he writes the following: "Small-scale airborne missions near Smolensk and in the Crimea in 1941 failed amid heavy losses although one group near Smolensk did manage to continue operating as partisans.... Major airborne operations (two brigades) were attempted in September 1943 in the Ukraine near Kiev, Kanev, and Cherkassy--but they did not end well."

The trouble can be traced primarily to inadequate training and the lack of special equipment but also the basic Soviet attitude of tackling innovations very cautiously; where they were able to employ fast-moving, mobile vanguard detachments in order to achieve success similar to the kind of success that can be achieved with airborne forces they chose the former.

#### Soviet Airborne Forces Today

They undoubtedly represent the showpiece of the ground forces as such. They are present during every May or October parade; they play an outstanding role in all Soviet and Warsaw Pact maneuvers. All airborne divisions are included among the elite units and they are also distinguished outwardly in this sense.

They are the only troops to wear the sky-blue beret, shoulderboards and collar flashes of the same color (blue being the color of the air which so to speak represents the bridge leading to their operations zone).

A blue-white striped shirt is somewhat reminiscent of the Navy; indeed, one can read now and then that these stripes are supposed to remind us of "landing and boarding."

Blue is also the dominant color in the army badge on the left-upper arm.

About 85 percent of all paratroopers, according to Soviet information, belong to the party of the Komsomol.

Modern Soviet airborne divisions were organized on the basis of a certain priority within the framework of the overall development of the Soviet ground forces after World War II which led via full motorization to full mechanization and finally to the atomic combat capability.

As deputy Soviet defense minister, Army General S. Sokolov emphasized, airborne formations assume an outstanding place in the planning of the Soviet General Staff. Here is what he said, verbatim: "The creation of nuclear missiles has enhanced the role of the airborne forces which can quickly exploit the results of atomic strikes by landing in the depth of the combat zone." There are many similar quotations from leading Soviet generals.

In keeping with this estimate, the Soviet military high command created airborne divisions which are supposed to number seven. In his most recent edition of "Die Armeen der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten" [The Armies of the Warsaw Pact States], F. Wiener even mentions nine divisions.

## Organization of Soviet Airborne Forces

The organization of Soviet airborne forces is based not only on the experiences of Soviet ground forces during World War II but also on the gains made in Soviet armament over the past three decades. Increased fire power and greater mobility are the main components of Soviet command methods applied to a force which is expected to accomplish missions also in the semistrategic range.

It was the intention of the Soviet military high command to give roughly equal consideration to both of these components. Here, greater mobility means not only the increased capacity of the airlift formations but also increased capabilities on the part of the paratroopers, after landing, in fighting to gain the initiative. One might say very well that the Soviet military high command managed to develop structural organizational forms which guaranteed both of these aspects--great fire power and the necessary mobility in combat. The following, most important basic principles were considered in this connection.

A well-thought-out organizational setup, such as we find it to be similar in the case of motorized rifle and tank divisions permits the formation of a strong first echelon and, by bringing up an albeit weaker second echelon facilitates a certain depth for every attacking formation;

The extensive use of the ASU-57 and ASU-85 airborne SP mounts, as well as the light-weight amphibious airborne tank, Model BMD, turned the airborne formations into a fully mechanized force which combines fire power and mobility and which thus offers maximum combat value;

The likewise necessary artillery support is provided by available guns and mortars;

Because the Soviets, as we know, have always assigned utmost importance to reconnaissance, the corresponding necessary reconnaissance forces are of course present in structural terms;

Likewise, the corresponding engineer, AA, AT, and communications units were not overlooked either.

On the whole, we can speak of a balanced, well-turned-out organizational setup which naturally takes into consideration the special facts involved in airborne landings and which combines great fire power and great mobility. It gives this force a high combat value which is further increased--and the Soviets are particularly aware of that--when the element of surprise is also employed.

### Equipment and Armament.

Here we must distinguish between two major complexes: weapons and equipment which are part of the standard gear of all Soviet standard divisions,



and special weapons and equipment created particularly for the Soviet airborne formations.

#### Standard Equipment

Every paratrooper is equipped with an AKM (Avtomat Kalashnikova modernisirovaniy [Modernized Kalashnikov Automatic]) automatic carbine [assault rifle], of course in a special version for airborne troops, with the folding stock (Figure 3). This is a modern, high-performance small arm which can fire 30 rounds semiautomatic or automatic from a clip.

Every squad has a light MG, the RPK (Rutshnoy pulimet Kalashnikove [Kalashnikov Automatic Rifle]) (Figure 3). This weapon likewise is modern and very efficient.

By way of AP weapons, the airborne units would seem to have both the 57-mm AT gun and the 85-mm gun (photos 4 and 5). The constant modernization of the Soviet Armed Forces leads us to expect that these weapons--or at least parts thereof--will be replaced with AT rockets. Here we might mention above all the SAGGER AT rocket which can be fired not only from a vehicle but which can be taken apart and carried in a case and which can be employed by individual soldiers or by squads in any terrain (Figure 6). Moreover, every airborne formation has a considerable number of close-range AT weapons among which the RPG 2 (Reaktsionniy Protivatankoviy Granatomet [Recoilless AT Grenade Launcher]) in recent years was generally replaced by the RPG 7, a newer, improved, and more effective "bazooka." All airborne formations have certainly nowadays been issued large numbers of these standard bazookas (Figure 7).

By way of artillery support, they have first of all the 120-mm mortar (Figure 8) and the modern, efficient, M63 D-30 gun-howitzer (Figure 9) which, equipped with a triple trail [outrigger] all-around gun mount, can fire both in the upper and in the lower group of elevations. This is one of the most effective weapons of the Soviet ground forces as a whole.

Finally we come to the AA weapons where we might mention the 23-mm twin AA mount Model ZU-23-2, an extremely modern and effective weapon which is currently in widespread use as standard weapon against low-flying aircraft. It is also suitable for ground action and this would seem to be particularly important in the commitment of airborne formations (Figure 10). Furthermore, every airborne formation would seem to have an adequate number of SA-7s--the way they are called in Soviet terminology--in other words, "the STRELA portable AA rockets" (NATO designation: GRAIL). This is a simple, easily operated weapon for use against low-flying aircraft which is fired from the gunner's shoulder and which obviously was subjected to extensive effectiveness tests in Vietnam and in 1973 in Egypt (Figure 11). As we know, the Israelis in 1973 used flash cartridges for defense against the SA-7 which developed a greater heat radiation than the engines of the aircraft and which thus diverted the rockets from their target.

In order to increase mobility, the airborne formations of course also have lightly armored, two-axle and all-wheeled vehicles, the so-called BRDM, which is particularly suitable for reconnaissance and which can be used as multipurpose vehicle in many ways (Figure 12).

#### Special Weapons and Special Equipment

Here we might mention first of all the ASU-85 (Aviadesantnaya Samokhodnaya Ustanovka--Airborne SP Mount), and armored, airtransportable SP mount which is not amphibious and which is the only equipment item of the airborne forces that cannot be airdropped. It must thus be delivered by cargo aircraft or helicopter. Its 85-mm gun gives the airborne formations primarily fire power and striking power. It has been issued to airborne formations since 1962 (Figure 13).

Next we might mention the ASU-57, a lightly armored AP mount, in whose box-like combat compartment there is room for a squad (Figure 14). Its 57-mm cannon gives it considerable fire power. But, in contrast to the ASU-85, it can also be dropped by parachute.

The AS-57 might possibly be replaced by the BMD (Bronevaya Mashina Desantnaya [Armored Assault Vehicle]). This APC, equipped with one 73-mm gun, three MGs, and one SAGGER AT rocket, can likewise accommodate one squad and represents a considerable improvement of the ASU-57; it will greatly help increase the mobility and fire power and thus the combat value of the airborne forces even further (Figure 15).

The BM-14 rocket launcher, a multiple launcher with 16 barrels, has been issued to the airborne forces in a special model for many years and considerably helps increase the fire power of the paratroopers (Figure 16).

Of course, there are special radio sets which make it easier or which make it possible for the paratroopers to assemble during the first few minutes after their drop--a vital requirement which frequently ensures the success of an operation to begin with (Figure 17).

The weak point of all paratroopers comes during the interval of time between the moment they hit the silk and the assembly on the ground. This interval must be kept as short as possible and depends also on special parachutes which must guarantee the most compact possible landing pattern in a small area. There is no doubt that these special parachutes do exist.

There are also special parachutes for the airdrop of heavy equipment, provided with braking rockets, so that the equipment will hit the ground relatively gently (Figure 19).

In summary we can say that the equipment and armament of the Soviet airborne formations is in every respect up to the level of modern technology in the Soviet Union. They have systems of well balanced weapons and equipment which meet the special requirements of these forces. The special role, which the airborne troops play within the Soviet ground forces, lead us to expect that they will be given priority also in the future.

## Soviet Air Transport Units

The existence of presumably seven airborne divisions seems to make sense only if there are enough air transport units available which can make it possible to employ a considerable portion of these airborne divisions, perhaps one or two divisions. Such a capacity certainly exists. To the purely military airlift space we must however add a portion of the civilian airline company, AEROFLOT, whose capacity in recent years has been increased steadily. Although this AEROFLOT faces special missions in wartime, it will undoubtedly be available in the military sphere, at least with some of its elements, for specific operations, with a time limit on them. There is a certain shortage of helicopters but it has been reduced recently. What are the transport aircraft that are available?

Here we might first of all mention the design team ("Collective") of Oleg Antonov which has built a whole series of efficient transport aircraft. The most customary type here is the An-12 (CUB) (Figure 22). It can carry 100 paratroopers with full gear or about 14 t cargo for airdrops.

Then comes the An-22 (COCK), the Soviet Union's biggest transport aircraft, which can carry a maximum payload of 80 t without any special requirements in terms of takeoff and landing fields. These aircraft are used to carry primarily heavy weapons and heavy equipment (Figure 21).

The capacity of the An-12 and An-22 aircraft was demonstrated particularly during the 1970 (DUeNA [DVINA]) maneuvers. According to a report by TASS [USSR Telegraph Agency], 8,000 men and 160 units of heavy "technical combat equipment" were airdropped within 22 minutes by these two types of transport aircraft.

The development of new large and heavy cargo aircraft continues in the Soviet Union. Today, new IL-76 [Ilyushin] (CANDID) cargo aircraft are used on all routes over Siberia. Although this cargo aircraft--which is equipped with four turbojet engines (Figure 20) and which can carry 40-t--is intended in peacetime primarily for use with the civilian AEROFLOT; it has a capability for military transport missions likewise; this capability is aided especially by the STOL features and the possibility of landing on unimproved strips.

All of the aircraft types mentioned can take off from and land on unimproved strips.

## Training

As in the case of all armed forces throughout the world, the Soviet airborne troops likewise reveal some very strict selection criteria. The men have to sign up as volunteers, their physical performance capacity is strictly supervised and there is of course also a political selection aspect to make sure that all airborne units will consist of specially selected personnel.

Individual training is designed to develop special qualities in every man. This includes, among other things, initiative, ingenuity in the employment of ruses of war, but above all intrepid aggressiveness and the ability to withstand physical and psychological stresses. Sharing dangers and experiences helps weld officers and enlisted men together into a unit and every exercise helps them move close to that goal.

Special jump training from the air is fashioned in an ingenious and manifold way. Figure 24 comes from a special Soviet dictionary. It is a drawing of the various types of training given to Soviet paratroopers. It resembles Western training centers, at least with regard to the type of training facilities. There are no training facilities which could not also be encountered in West Germany or among our NATO partners.

The main points of combat training include map reading and terrain orientation; training as AT fighters ("every airborne soldier a tank killer!"); familiarity with all types of combat, especially switching from one combat method to another; study of the command and combat principles of the potential enemy as well as his weapons and gear; combat methods used by possible partisans; practice jumps at night and over difficult terrain (forests, mountains).

Officers are supposed to display a particular degree of aggressive and moral qualities, above all the ability to make independent decisions and to preserve the high combat spirit of their units in any situation. They are to be able to conduct combat operations without having precise information on the enemy.

In their own interest, they must constantly engage in reconnaissance and even where they have no information on the enemy, they must be able correctly to judge the enemy's actions. Above all however they must be always ready to beat off an enemy attack from any direction and they must try to strike the enemy by surprise.

In specially set-up training areas and obstacle courses as well as maneuver areas, the young paratroopers learn what they need to get through the time interval that is most dangerous to them: the time between the landing and the attainment of a certain degree of combat readiness. That includes the following: knowledge of command signals, marching by the compass, terrain orientation, quick recovery of weapons and preparation of heavy weapons, making ready for combat in the shortest possible time, assembly and rapid approach march to the attack objective and readiness immediately to go into action upon commands from superiors.

Soviet literature again and again mentions the requirement for coping with difficult combat situations and critical moments. The view is likewise advocated that darkness and poor visibility constitute the foundation for the paratrooper's successful accomplishment of the assigned mission. "Night is the paratrooper's friend"--a motto which we encounter again and again.

## Commitment of Airborne Troops

The Soviets distinguish between tactical, semi-strategic, and strategic airborne landings. We might say by way of introduction here that this article does not deal with tactical airborne landings. A tactical airborne landing as a rule is carried out not by paratroopers but by motorized riflemen, dropped from helicopters, up to the size of a reinforced battalion.

A semi-strategic airborne landing is one in which a reinforced regiment [regimental combat team] is normally employed. This kind of mission can be expected in the context of an army-group operation with the objective of winning a semi-strategic victory.

A strategic airborne landing finally would be one in which airborne units on the order of about up to two divisions would be committed "in the course of the coordination of combat operations by the army groups" and the semi-strategic major units of various armed forces components, in order to attain the objective "of a development phase in the war, a campaign, or perhaps even the entire war."

The following would seem to be attack objectives of Soviet airborne landings:

capturing important terrain segments and sectors, road intersections, and mountain passes;

capturing bridges, crossing points, and overcoming water obstacles in suitable sectors;

supporting friendly attack units while breaking through defense systems echeloned in depth and overcoming water obstacles;

wiping out atomic weapons and artillery, CPs and communications centers, ammunition dumps, and miscellaneous targets;

cutting off the enemy's retreat and preventing the enemy from moving up reserves;

supporting seaborne landings;

capturing airfields to secure the facility for the purpose of landing troops and equipment.

This list of most important assignments also clearly shows that the Soviet airborne forces are a definite element in the Soviet view as to the priority of attack.

## Execution of Airborne Landings

To be sure, the Soviets only rarely write about the execution of airborne landings; nevertheless, an analysis of various current sources enables us to observe the following:

semi-strategic and strategic airborne landings are planned in cooperation between HQ and the headquarters of the army groups involved and are carried out by the army groups;

tactical airborne landings are under the responsibility of the field army CG.

the preparation of each airborne landing includes the procurement of the necessary reconnaissance documentation, the ascertainment of support for airborne formations from the air force and the artillery, as well as air space security. In general they follow the principle that airborne landings should be carried out with air superiority which would be limited at least in terms of time and place.

The particular commander of a formation is responsible for the implementation of an airborne landing as "combined arms commander." He gets his documentation on the enemy and other such items from his next higher headquarters. The situation estimate is preceded by intensive map study. The designation of landing grounds is important. They are to facilitate the rapid assembly of the airdrop formations; they must not be too far from the target which in turn should be capable of being reached if possible under cover [concealment] and quickly.

Soviet paratroopers are to attack the enemy if possible immediately after landing because they will be superior to the enemy at least for a certain span of time. This is why the airborne unit should assume a kind of combat formation already during the approach flight so that the attack can be launched immediately.

If the airborne unit must accomplish an assignment as part of a major attack operation, it must hold its target until the attack forces approach. In that case the most important job is to dig in.

The paratroopers must always expect the enemy to try, for example, to move his atomic weapons beyond the range of their attack. To counteract this, an attempt should be made to place ambushes along anticipated retreat routes.

The combat formation of the airborne troops as a rule consists of one echelon, whereby the reserve includes up to one third of the forces available. As always and everywhere, the Soviets, in all of their airborne operations, seek to retain the element of surprise. This is done primarily by means of the following measures:

total secrecy regarding preparatory measures;

preference to be given to weather situations involving reduced visibility;  
exploitation of twilight and darkness at low flying altitudes;  
exploitation of areas with few defending forces (no armored units nearby);  
dropping units as closely as possible to the targets.

Of course, every tactical airborne landing is subject to the pertinent Soviet regulations concerning secrecy.

### Evaluation and Conclusions

As part of the modernization of the Soviet Armed Forces following World War II, the airborne forces likewise underwent fundamental changes. Equipped with efficient and effective modern weapons systems of the most varied kinds, delivered to the enemy by efficient cargo aircraft units, they can accomplish even difficult combat missions. The great requirements, which the Soviet military high command establishes for these forces already in peacetime, would lead us to expect--in case of a military conflict--that they will be assigned corresponding missions.

The question is as to when and where and in what situation Soviet airborne landings are to be expected. Here we must clearly distinguish between the strategic, semi-strategic, and tactical airborne operations established by the Soviets themselves.

In addition to the assembly of strong airborne units, strategic airborne landings require comprehensive organizational measures, the concentration of strong airlift units, strong air force units for the purpose of providing an air umbrella, and especially much time for preparation. To be sure, leading Soviet military commanders often enough made reference to the missions of Soviet airborne forces in the strategic range. But we must not forget that every airborne operation entails a certain risk. An airborne landing on the strategic scale would mean, for the Soviets, that they would have to risk possibly up to one quarter of their airborne capacity and more than half of their airlift space. Since, moreover, a strategic airborne landing would seem to make sense only within the context of an attack operation by strong attacking forces, we come to the question as to whether, in view of the Soviet supremacy of ground forces, one should really often expect the risk of a strategic airborne landing. According to all observations and experiences, the answer to this must be: not often, but a strategic airborne landing cannot be ruled out! The practice hitherto observed in Soviet and Warsaw Pact maneuvers likewise supports this judgment.

The question as to semi-strategic airborne landings must be judged entirely differently. There are numerous references that the frequently noted remarks by Soviet military commanders relate primarily to airborne landings in the semi-strategic range. The expenditure in terms of organization, time, and airlift capacity is within tolerable limits; it therefore seems that this effort would be justified compared to the anticipated successes but also the possibly existing risks. In other words, we can expect

semi-strategic airborne landings, roughly in the strength of a regimental combat team. Semi-strategic airborne landings have been observed during almost all Soviet and Warsaw Pact maneuvers in recent years. This too can be considered evidence in support of the above evaluation.

The judgment of tactical airborne landings would seem to turn out to be identical or similar. Here it will, so to speak, be "standard operating procedure" that the motorized riflemen will be employed in company or battalion strength in any situation and development phase. Tactical airborne landings are simple and uncomplicated and can be carried out without too much effort; these are prerequisites which are in keeping with Soviet command methods and Soviet mentality.

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## PHOTO CAPTIONS

- Photo 1. Soviet airborne troopers wearing winter uniforms in cargo aircraft on way to drop zone. The aircraft does not have a pressurized cabin and is flying at higher altitude; this is indicated by the fact that the soldiers are wearing special oxygen masks. The main chute is carried on the back and the chute is carried on the chest. The Model PD 6r older training chutes weighing a total of 14 kg. The Model PD 41-1 combat chutes weigh 17 kg. The reserve chutes carried on the chest with the ripcord are designated PZ.
- Photo 2. (left) Airborne troopers in summer parade uniform during march-past. Their headgear consists of the sky-blue berets with the cockade and the acute-angle red cloth triangle with the insignia of the branch of service on the right side of the headgear. On the olive-colored blouse--with the collarless white-blue striped shirt--we can see the blue shoulder boards with the Cyrillic letters "CA" (---Soviet Army); we also note the blue collar flashes with the insignia of the arm of the service, and, on the left-upper arm, the insignia of the particular arm, as sleeve badge.
- Photo 3. Airborne troopers equipped with AKM automatic carbine (foreground); soldier on left carries RPK MG.
- Photo 4. 57-mm Kh-26 ATG with auxiliary drive (maximum range 6,700 m).
- Photo 5. 85-mm Model SD-44 gun with auxiliary drive (maximum range 15.6 km).
- Photo 6. SAGGER portable guided AT rocket on base plate.
- Photo 7. RPG-7 bazooka (range up to 300 m).
- Photo 8. 120-mm mortar.
- Photo 9. 122-mm Model M-63 D30 gun-howitzer (maximum range 15.3 km).
- Photo 10. ZU-23 AA twin mount.
- Photo 11. SA-7/GRAIL portable AA rocket.
- Photo 12. BRDM.
- Photo 13. ASU-85 armored airborne SP mount.
- Photo 14. ASU-57 airborne SP mount.
- Photo 15. Amphibious airborne APC, Model BMD.
- Photo 16. Type BM-14 multiple rocket launcher.
- Photo 17. Company commander of airborne unit with two radio operators equipped with portable Type R-105 M radios.

- Photo 18. An-12/CUB Soviet transport aircraft shown dropping heavy weapons or heavy gear, using cargo chute systems. The gear or the weapons are secured on special drop pallets prior to the time they are loaded on the aircraft. Depending upon the weight of the gear to be dropped, the cargo chute systems consist of 3, 4, or 5 parachutes which are disconnected on the ground after the grill-shaped pallets have hit the ground.
- Photo 19. So-called soft landing methods for heavy cargo were displayed for the first time, outside the Soviet Union, during the 1966 "MOLDAU" Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Czechoslovakia. Between the shroud lines of the parachute system, which consisted of a particularly large cargo chute, a cluster of braking rockets was attached; it was ignited shortly before the load hit the ground by means of ground interval sensors suspended from the cargo pallet.
- Photo 20. The most modern Soviet cargo aircraft is the four-jet IL-76/CANDID which has been in service since 1971.
- Photo 21. The biggest Soviet transport aircraft is the An-22/COCK. This aircraft is used on military missions for carrying ground-to-ground rocket launchers (the photo shows the unloading of the FROG-3 rocker launchers), AA rocket launchers, the AS-85 airborne tank, as well as particularly bulky cargo.
- Photo 22. The "workhorse" of the Soviet airlift force for parachute missions and for transporting airdroppable gear is the An-12/CUB. The photo shows paratroopers, lined up with full gear, in front of An-12 aircraft.
- Photo 23. Paratrooper training on the exercise tower. Tough, realistic training imparts to every Soviet paratrooper the qualities which he will need to accomplish even the most difficult missions.
- Photo 25. As soon as airborne units have reached their landing zone or drop zone, they set up CPs for further operational command looking in the main direction of the enemy. The photo shows a CP covered with camouflage netting and set up for such operations. On the left, in the foreground, we see an artillery OP for fire control for the artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers. Further to the rear we see the commanding officer of the airborne unit with the radios for contact with the field units.
- Photo 26. Soviet paratroopers immediately after jumping from aircraft. In the case of the first five jumpers, the auxiliary chutes pull the main parachutes, carried on the back, out of the pack; in the case of the two jumpers further to the rear, the main chutes are unfolding. The last parachute is already fully unfolded. If the main chute fails, the reserve chute, carried on the chest, can be opened manually.




Figure 24. Paratrooper Training Area. Key: 1--entrance; 2--lecture hall building; 3--balloon gondolas; 4--parachute suspension frame; 5--catapult seat trainer; 6--aircraft mockups; 7--ground trainer; 8--helicopter mockup; 9--jump tower; 10--chute packing hall; 11--rotatable swing; 12--practice jump net; 13--circular track; 14--suspension bar; 15--hand-over-hand bar; 16--jump tower; 17--packing canvas; 18--suspension frame; 19--touchdown drop platforms; 20-30--parachute parts; 21--parachute canopy; 22--canopy base; 23--shroud lines; 24--double shroud lines; 25--main carrying belts with belt buckles and ripcords for automatic and annual jump chute; 26--main chute packing cover; 27--ripcord; 28--inside packaging cover; 29--auxiliary chute; 30--packing sleeve; 31--cargo chute system with pallet.

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